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entry and sales activity and estimate the model’s structural parameters with simulated 
method of moments. We then demonstrate that our adapted model is able to replicate 
important dimensions of the in-sample moments conditioned in our estimation strategy 
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1. Introduction 
 The remarkable growth of offshore production by multinational firms is a key 
feature of economic globalization. The worldwide sales of foreign affiliates by 
multinationals grew an average of 11.7 percent per year for the period 1991-2005 while 
the global GDP and exports of goods and services grew 5.7 and 8.8 percent, respectively. 
In 2009, the gross product of all foreign affiliates accounted for 9.4 percent of the global 
GDP (UNCTAD, 2010). Multinational production has played a prominent role in global 
economic integration. 
 While many countries around the globe have opened up for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), manufacturing firms at home have gone through a distinctive change 
across different size distributions. Determining percentile bins by the volume of global 
sales in 1996, Table 1 tabulates the number of all firms and multinational parents in 
Japanese manufacturing for 1996 and 2006.1 Total firms declined in number by 8.9 
percent, but total multinationals increased by a whopping 72.5 percent. By dissecting 
aggregate changes, we observe that smaller and medium firms disproportionately 
declined in number whereas larger multinationals substantially increased. In addition, 
Table 2 presents the volume of sales in trillions of 2006 Japanese Yen. Total domestic 
sales declined in volume by 7.1 percent, but total multinational sales increased by 
almost 100 percent. While total global sales growth increased by 3.8 percent, almost all 
of the growth was concentrated at the largest 1% of firms, whereas the average small 
and medium sized firms contracted.  Taken together, the tables indicate that larger firms 
have fared much better in terms of entry, exit, and survival. 
 
=== Tables 1 & 2=== 
 
 These trends illustrate a pattern of firm dynamics as a result of increasing economic 
integration, which have been well theorized in the heterogeneous trade models. 
Launched by the work of Melitz (2003), this literature emphasizes the role of 
heterogeneity and the self-selection of firms into servicing foreign markets. Due to high 
                                                              
1 Global sales include domestic, export, and foreign affiliate sales at the parent-firm level. Results 
are quantitatively similar when the size is measured by domestic employment. Details of the data are 
explained in section 5. 
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fixed costs in foreign market entry, only the larger, more productive firms can exploit 
the opportunities from markets abroad. At the same time, increased competition from 
abroad puts pressure on domestic-oriented, smaller sized firms, causing the least 
productive ones to exit. This restructuring of production to more efficient firms 
generates overall aggregate productivity gains. The resulting firm dynamics carries 
important policy implications related to welfare gains and the asymmetric impacts of 
economic integration on firms. 
 The discussion above highlights the importance of explicitly understanding the 
micro-economic channels that occur at the individual firm-level and their aggregate 
implications they contain on the rest of the economy. However, standard econometric 
approaches are generally not well designed for quantifying asymmetric impacts of 
changes in FDI barriers across individual firms and are not capable of generating 
counterfactual analysis. To improve our ability to assess the impacts of increasing FDI 
integration, we require a quantitative framework that is capable of dissecting the 
aggregate shocks into firm-level components while simultaneously relating these 
impacts to the rest of the economy in an integrated framework. 
The objective of this research is to develop a micro-simulation framework for 
multinational activities across countries. To our knowledge, no study has applied a 
framework that can quantitatively assess the impacts of changes in FDI barriers by 
simulating the activity at the individual firm level. To this end, we apply a model of 
heterogeneous firms adapted from Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010, EKK hereafter) 
to multinational production. EKK introduce a rich quantitative framework that is 
capable of simulating individual firm exporting activity, consistent with actual French 
manufacturing firms. Their framework is based on a monopolistic competition model of 
heterogeneous firms with Pareto efficiency and iceberg trade costs adapted from Melitz 
(2003) and Chaney (2008). We adapt their model to multinational activity by allowing 
firms to produce in a local market and abstract from the role of trade. Instead of 
incurring iceberg trade costs, heterogeneous firms must pay technology transfer and 
management costs to serve foreign consumers via offshore production.2  
                                                              
2  A fundamental role of firm efficiency in building offshore production is consistent with the 
traditional literature on FDI in that firm-specific assets such as managerial skills, superior technology, 
and production processes are a key motive of direct investment (Markusen, 2002). 
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 The entry decision depends on efficiency, fixed entry costs, and market 
attractiveness. The latent foreign sales are dependent on the entry hurdle and firm- and 
market-specific profitability. These two conditions govern the behavior of 
heterogeneous firms to invest abroad and generate foreign sales. The model predicts that 
more productive firms are more likely than less productive firms to enter a larger 
number of markets, to penetrate less attractive markets, and to yield larger sales per 
each market. These predictions point to a “pecking order” in which every multinational 
that invests in a certain market should establish an affiliate in all the markets that are 
more attractive than that market. Nevertheless, entry and demand shocks in the model 
allow for a deviation of the strict form of the “pecking order” in the data. 
 To parameterize our model to Japanese multinationals, we use a comprehensive 
dataset of manufacturing firms with foreign affiliates. The data set is constructed by 
linking two confidential firm-level surveys from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI). Prior work such as Wakasugi et al. (2008) and Todo (2009) 
has used the same data to examine a systematic difference between multinational and 
non-multinational firms in Japan. By contrast, we illustrate and simulate the scale and 
scope of Japanese multinationals. Furthermore, the substantial volume of direct 
investment from Japan makes Japanese industries an interesting case for simulating 
heterogeneous multinationals. In 2009, Japan was the third largest source of FDI, 
following the U.S. and France (UNCTAD, 2010). However, inward FDI in Japan was 
significantly lower than the U.S. and France, highlighting the large role of Japanese 
multinational parents in domestic industries. Dissecting the micro-level data, we 
document the empirical regularities of multinational entry and sales activity, suggesting 
that the stylized patterns are in line with the main properties of our adapted model. 
 Following EKK, entry and latent sales conditions are re-specified to simulate 
heterogeneous multinational firms. To simplify the specification, aggregate parameters 
are connected with some features of the data, so that four parameters of underlying 
stochastic distributions govern the behavior of heterogeneous firms in serving a foreign 
market: size dispersion, entry and market shocks, and a correlation of these shocks. For 
our estimation strategy, we use simulated method of moments to estimate an optimal set 
of parameters (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989). We use the theoretical 
implications of the model to choose a set of four moment conditions: pecking order 
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strings, affiliate sales distributions across markets, parent sales distribution in Japan, and 
multinational production intensity. 
 We simulate our sample of firms to obtain the set of optimal parameters, which are 
close to the estimates found for French firms in EKK. Our results show that the level of 
size dispersion for Japanese multinationals is larger than French exporting firms (EKK, 
2010). The estimated variance of a market shock is very similar between Japanese and 
French data whereas our estimated variance of an entry shock is slightly larger. This 
implies that the decision to invest abroad would involve more uncertainty than the 
decision to export. Furthermore, the market shock has much larger variance than the 
entry shock, suggesting that we can precisely simulate affiliate entry more than affiliate 
sales. 
Our simulation approach is advantageous in its ability to rigorously assess model 
performance through validation exercises. Our in-sample moment testing demonstrates 
that the model is internally consistent with the data. Our simulated multinationals fit the 
actual Japanese multinational activity quite well in terms of the moments used in 
estimation. Additionally, the simulated firms can also closely follow the level of foreign 
market penetration, replicating activity not conditioned in our estimation strategy. Lastly, 
the model does a reasonable job in out of sample simulations of 1996 multinational 
activity in a significantly different environment of FDI integration from what was 
conditioned upon in our 2006 estimation sample. Our validation exercises also reveal 
several shortcomings of the model.  Large firms tend to invest in too many markets and 
small firms invest in too few markets. Additionally, the model cannot account well for 
Japanese multinationals motivated by offshore production for exporting. However 
overall, the internal and external validation tests instill a strong level of confidence in 
our model being used for performing quantitative analysis on multinational behavior.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the EKK model for multinational production with 
heterogeneous firms. Section 4 explains our simulation framework to generate artificial 
multinationals. Section 5 describes data sources and empirical features of Japanese 
multinational activities. Section 6 presents the estimation results and model validation 
tests. Section 7 concludes. 
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2.  Related Literature 
This paper is related to the literature on firm heterogeneity in the analysis of 
international trade and investment. Helpman et al. (2004) build on the work of Brainard 
(1997) and Melitz (2003) to introduce the decision to export and invest abroad in a 
model of heterogeneous firms. According to efficiency levels, every firm decides 
whether to serve a foreign market, and whether to export or produce offshore. The 
model predicts that only the most productive firms choose local production in which 
fixed costs are larger than exporting, but variable costs are lower. The productivity 
advantage of multinationals is consistent with the evidence provided by Head and Ries 
(2003) from publicly listed Japanese manufacturing firms and Girma et al. (2005) from 
U.K. manufacturing firms. In addition, Tomiura (2007) shows that firms with a foreign 
production facility are larger and more productive than firms that only export. By 
contrast, we highlight the role of firm heterogeneity in accounting for the location and 
extent of multinational production. 
 Recent studies on the location decision of heterogeneous multinationals are 
particularly relevant to our work. Aw and Lee (2008) modify the model of firm 
heterogeneity in horizontal and vertical FDI by Grossman et al. (2006) to account for 
location choices of multinationals headquartered in a middle-income country. They 
show that relatively productive firms engage in FDI, and the most productive firms 
invest in multiple markets, for which they provide evidence from Taiwanese 
multinationals. Chen and Moore (2010) further analyze whether host-country 
characteristics influence the location decision of heterogeneous multinationals. Using 
French firm data, they demonstrate that more productive multinationals are more likely 
than less productive ones to invest in less attractive markets with high investment costs. 
 In addition, Yeaple (2009) shows that the number and size of foreign affiliates 
increase with respect to productivity by U.S. parent firms. He also illustrates a 
systematic deviation from the strict “pecking order”, suggesting that heterogeneity in 
efficiency is not sufficient to explain the structure of multinational activity. Our work 
complements these studies, but differs in that we adopt a structural approach to estimate 
a set of underlying parameters of firm heterogeneity. Because we can simulate 
production location of heterogeneous multinationals, this approach is advantageous in 
that we can explicitly test the fit between the model and many features of the data 
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(Keane, 2010). 
 Finally, our research adds to the limited literature on structural econometric analysis 
of trade and investment. Bernard et al. (2003) incorporate heterogeneous exporting 
plants in the model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) to embed the plant-level exporting 
decision in the trade model. Two underlying parameters in production and consumption 
are calibrated to match two moments between simulated and real exporters, i.e., 
productivity and size advantages. However, parameter values are searched to match 
only two moments so that a model fit is not satisfactory in other features of exporting 
plants. In this respect, we account for many moments of multinational activities in 
calibration to demonstrate a good fit between simulated and real multinationals. Along 
the same line, EKK (2010) is a seminal work that builds a model of international trade 
with heterogeneous firms that is consistent with many stylized facts. As we apply their 
framework to multinational production, this paper can be taken in a sense as 
demonstrating the tractability of their model. 
 Additionally, Ramondo (2010) takes a structural approach to quantify gains from 
multinational production. Her focus differs from our analysis in that we can link a 
change in the global environment with multinational production at the firm-level. Along 
the same line with Ramondo (2010), we do not consider the role of trade in intermediate 
inputs and final goods by multinationals for data limitations.3 Because we do not have 
access to confidential trade data, it is not possible to link manufacturing firms with their 
exports by destination. The lack of firm-level export sales by destination restricts us to 
focus exclusively on multinational production, where we leave the incorporation of 
exporting activity for future research. 
 
3. An EKK Model for Multinational Production 
Our model is adapted from EKK’s (2010) heterogeneous exporting firm model.  
This model is in turn based on a class of heterogeneous trade models introduced by 
Melitz (2003) and incorporates stochastic entry and demand shocks and market-access 
                                                              
3 See, for example, Feinberg and Keane (2006), Keller and Yeaple (2008), Garetto (2009), and 
Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) for a structural model of input trading between multinational 
parent firms and their affiliates, which allows for substitution and complementary relationships 
between FDI and exports. 
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costs.4 The key elements of the model are a Pareto distribution of firm efficiency, Dixit-
Stiglitz demand, iceberg trade barriers, fixed entry costs, and asymmetry in markets. We 
briefly present a modified version of the EKK model for multinational production. 
 There are N host countries for local production. Each host country n has aggregate 
demand for manufacturing varieties Xn and factor costs wn. We assume costly 
technology transfer for offshore production, giving rise to increasing marginal costs of 
serving foreign markets. Each pair of countries i and n is separated by technology 
barriers that rise in unit cost in proportion dni. In this setting, dni may be interpreted as 
the information costs of working broad, transaction costs of dealing with FDI policy 
barriers5, costs of maintaining the affiliate, servicing network costs, and other costs 
associated with technology costs in offshore production.6 For domestic production, we 
set dii = 1. 
 
3.1 Producer Technology 
 Each country has a continuum of potential producers, each producing a unique 
good j with efficiency ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ. A firm in home country i can produce good j in host 
country n by local production, with its unit costs given by: 
ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
௪೙ௗ೙೔
௭೔ሺ௝ሻ
          (1) 
where unit costs are increasing in host market’s factor costs, wn, and technology transfer 
costs dni, and decreasing in firm productivity ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ. 
 As in Melitz (2003), each firm draws a random productivity parameter from some 
distribution. Following the trade literature, we assume a Pareto distribution. Then, a 
measure of potential producers with efficiency at least ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ is: 
μ୧
ZሺZ ൒ zሻ ൌ T୧zିθ,   z ൐ 0        (2) 
The parameter Ti governs the average level of efficiency/technology in country i, and 
                                                              
4 See Helpman et al. (2004) and Chaney (2008) for extensions. 
5 FDI policy restrictions may increase the costs of multinationals operating abroad in terms of 
ownership constraints, foreign-specific regulations, and weak legal protection of property/capital. 
(World Bank, 2010) 
6 This feature is similar in nature to Keller and Yeaple (2008), showing that US owned foreign 
affiliates find it more difficult to substitute local production for imports from the multinational 
parent when technologies are complex. Also, it is consistent with the findings in Ramondo (2008) 
and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) that multinational costs are increasing in distance, 
language barriers, and national borders. 
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the parameter θ  governs the distribution of productivity across firms, which is assumed 
constant across countries. Since all goods are uniquely produced by a single firm and 
differ solely on the dimension of productivity, the terms “goods” and “firm” can be 
indexed interchangeably. Multinational firms with superior technology have lower unit 
costs, and spread the benefits of this efficiency through cheaper goods. 
 Equation (1) leads to ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݓ௡݀௡௜ ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ⁄ . Then, the measure of goods that can be 
produced in country n through affiliate production by firms in country i with unit cost 
ܥ ൑ ܿ is: 
ߤ௡௜ሺܥ ൑ ܿሻ ൌ ߤ௜
௭ ቀ௪೙ௗ೙೔
௖
ቁ ൌ ௜ܶሺݓ௡݀௡௜ሻିఏሺܿሻఏ    (3)
 A firm will enter market n if its operating profits from affiliate sales are sufficient to 
overcome the fixed cost of setting up an affiliate. We assume that firm j incurs a fixed 
cost to set up an affiliate in n as follows: 
ܧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ         (4) 
where ܧ௡௜ is the general fixed cost that is constant for all firms entering n from i. The 
costs include both the physical costs of building a plant and the information/FDI barrier 
costs associated with establishing a new affiliate in a new market. The information costs 
are related to marketing research, foreign contacts, local recruiting for workers.7  FDI 
policy barrier fixed costs may include added additional regulations required to setup an 
affiliate. ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ is the idiosyncratic fixed cost specific to firm j entering market n. It 
accounts for unobservable factors in establishing a foreign affiliate by firm j in market n, 
with higher values indicating larger investment costs. 
 
3.2 Market Structure 
 A firm j with a price ݌௡ሺ݆ሻ in market n faces a residual demand curve given by: 
ܺ௡כሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙
ቁ
ଵିఙ
ܺ௡         (5) 
where ௡ܲ is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) price index averaged across all 
goods produced in country n (through home and foreign technology). ߪ is an elasticity 
of substitution between any two goods with ߪ  ൐ 1. Xn is aggregate expenditure on 
manufacturing goods in country n. ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ is an unobservable factor specific to demand 
                                                              
7 The fixed costs are also falling in production networks and agglomeration spillovers. 
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for individual variety produced by firm j in country n. It can be thought as a demand 
shock to individual affiliate of firm j, with higher values indicating a preferable shock to 
its product sales.  The * denotes the latency of our sales condition. 
The price index is the expectation of the prices of individual varieties available to 
consumers in n, with Ω௡ denoting the set of available goods: 
௡ܲ ൌ ܧሾߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ݌௡ሺ݆ሻଵିఙሿଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ     ׊݆ א Ω௡    (6) 
 With Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and monopolistic competition, each firm charges a 
constant markup ഥ݉ ൌ ߪ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄  over ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ. This yields a pricing rule: 
 ݌௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ഥ݉ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ   ഥ݉
௪೙ௗ೙೔
௭೔ሺ௝ሻ
                      (7) 
If firm j sells in country n, firm revenue is then: 
  ܺ௡כሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௠ഥ௖೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙
ቁ
ଵିఙ
ܺ௡              (8) 
With monopolistic competition, gross profits are proportional to sales, with 
proportionality of 1/ߪ . Thus, firm j will enter market n if its operating profits are 
sufficient to overcome the cost of entry: 
ܺ௡כሺ݆ሻ ൒  ߪܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ             (9) 
Substituting back in our latent sales expression, we can solve for ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ at this threshold 
level to derive the entry hurdle condition for affiliate production by firm j from country 
i in market n: 
ܿ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൑ ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ቀ
 ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
 ఌ೙ሺ௝ሻ
௑೙
ఙா೙೔ሺ௝ሻ
ቁ
ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
௉೙
௠ഥ
    (10) 
The entry condition implies that firm j will enter market n only if its unit costs are 
below the threshold level ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ. Given that firm j passes the entry condition, it will 
generate foreign affiliate sales given by (8). Because most firms do not engage in 
multinational production and most multinationals produce only in a few destinations, 
the majority of sales ܺ௡כሺ݆ሻ will be zero. 
 
3.3 Entry and Latent Sales Conditions 
 The price index Pn in each market depends on the number of foreign affiliates 
entering n and the level of their sales while a firm’s decision to establish an affiliate in 
turn depends on the price index Pn. From parameters ௜ܶ , ܺ௡, ݓ௡, ܧ௡௜, ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ, ߙ௜ሺ݆ሻ, ߝ௜ሺ݆ሻ, 
we can solve for the price index and derive the following two conditions: 
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Entry Hurdle: ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ ቀ
௑೙
఑భఙா೙೔ః೙
ቁ
ଵ/ఏ
   (11) 
Latent Sales: ܺ௡כሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻܿ௡ሺ݆ሻଵିఙߪܧ௡௜ ቀ
௑೙
఑భఙா೙೔ః೙
ቁ
భ
ഇ  (12) 
where: 
     ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
 ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
 ఌ೙ሺ௝ሻ
, 
     Φ௡ ൌ ∑ ௜ܶሺݓ௜݀௡௜ሻିఏூ௜ୀଵ , 
     ߢଵ ൌ
ఏ
ఏିሺఙିଵሻ
െ ׭ߙߟ
ሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ
഑షభ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟ. 
ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ is an overall entry shock that each firm faces to enter market n. Φ௡ summarizes 
the states of technology and input costs around the world, and investment barriers for 
implementing domestic technology abroad. A higher level of Φ௡  indicates that the 
country is more open to FDI and is thus a more competitive market. Each individual 
firm faces a different entry hurdle ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ that differs by country, with higher values 
indicating lower threshold unit costs to enter the market. Thus, the entry hurdle is lower 
for large market, low general entry costs, and higher Φ௡. 
 The latent sales condition implies that given that firm j enters a market n, its overall 
sales is increasing in its favorable demand shock and unit costs. Latent sales are also 
positively related to the general entry costs. Lastly, they are increasing in the overall 
market attractiveness, which is captured by the last component ሺܺ௡ ߢଵߪܧ௡௜ߔ௡⁄ ሻଵ ఏ⁄ . 
 The entry hurdle and latent sales conditions govern the decision of firm j as to 
which market to invest and how much to generate sales in that market. From these 
conditions, we can derive the empirical implications on entry and sales patterns of 
multinational firms with heterogeneous efficiency. Specifically, the model predicts that 
more productive firms are more likely than less productive firms (i) to enter a larger 
number of markets, (ii) to penetrate the less attractive markets, and (iii) to yield larger 
sales per each market. These predictions suggest that firms first enter the most attractive 
market, and then invest progressively in less attractive markets. In this case, there is a 
strict hierarchy of market destinations in which more productive firms progressively 
enter less attractive markets. 
 However, the strict hierarchy is not observed in the data. In the presence of entry 
and demand shocks in the model, firms with identical productivity need not exhibit 
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identical patterns of market entry and the volume of affiliate sales. Otherwise, any two 
of identical firms would have the same sales in any market where they enter. Thus, the 
model predicts a weak pecking order. To examine these empirical implications of the 
model, we simulate an artificial dataset of multinational firms in the following 
framework. 
 
4. Simulation Framework 
 We turn to describe the simulation framework for estimating the structural 
parameters of the model. The procedure proceeds (1) to re-specify the model derivations 
for simulation, (2) to simulate artificial firms given a particular set of parameter values, 
(3) to search a set of underlying parameters that minimize the distance of moments 
between artificial and real firms. We denote home country i, by J (Japan) and an 
artificial firm s, with ݏ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܵ. 
 
4.1 Respecification for Simulation 
 An artificial firm s, is simulated by a realization of random productivity draw ݖ௃ሺݏሻ, 
entry shock ߟ௡ሺݏሻ, and demand shock ߙ௡ሺݏሻ. For each simulated firm, its production is 
governed by the entry hurdle and latent sales conditions: equations (11) and (12). 
However, these conditions need to be re-specified for quantification. First, the 
heterogeneous component of unit costs is isolated by defining ݑሺݏሻ ൌ ௃ܶݖ௃ሺݏሻିఏ  as 
standardized unit costs. Then, the artificial firm can be generated from a simple uniform 
distribution that is independent of any parameters. Using the standardized unit costs, we 
can express the entry hurdle and latent sales conditions as: 
Entry Hurdle: ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯
்಻ሺ௪೙ௗ೙಻ሻషഇ
∑ ்೔ሺ௪೙ௗ೙೔ሻషഇ
ಿ
೔సభ
௑೙
ఙா೙
ߢଶߟ௡ሺݏሻఏ
෩    (13) 
Latent Sales: ܺ௡௃ሺݏሻ ൌ ߪܧ௡ ቀ
௨ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ቁ
ିଵ
ఏ෩ൗ ఈ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௦ሻ
      (14) 
where ߠ෨ ൌ ఏ
ఙିଵ
 and ߢଶ ൌ ׬ ߟఏ ሺ⁄ ఙିଵሻ ݃ଶሺߟሻ݀ߟ. 
The term θ෨  translates unobserved heterogeneity in producer efficiency into observed 
heterogeneity in sales. A higher value of θ implies less heterogeneity in efficiency while 
a higher value of σ translates a given efficiency in heterogeneity into a higher level of 
sales heterogeneity. Since we use data on domestic and foreign affiliate sales, we do not 
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directly estimate θ, but can only identify the parameter θ෨. 
 The conditions (13) and (14) contain market-level parameters that can be linked 
with aggregate data on multinational sales for parameterization. Following EKK, we 
can use a measure of all firms that pass the cost hurdle to obtain the measure of entrants 
into market n: 
௡ܰ ൌ ׬ൣߤ௡௃ሺܿҧ௡௃ሺߟሻሻ൧ ݃ଶሺߟሻ݀ߟ ൌ
఑మ
఑భ
௑೙
ఙா೙಻
     (15) 
Second, the parameter Φ௡ can be related to the FDI share of source country J in country 
n, ܺ௡௃ ܺ௡⁄ , as follows: 
ఓ೙಻ሺ௖ሻ
ఓ೙ሺ௖ሻ
ൌ
்಻൫௪೙ௗ೙಻൯
షഇ
ሺ௖ሻഇ
Φ೙
ൌ
 ௑೙಻
௑೙
       (16) 
The fraction of affiliates in market n employing technology from J is 
௜ܶሺݓ௡݀௡௜ሻିఏሺܿሻఏ Φ௡⁄ , which is also the fraction of spending by country n on goods 
supplied by the affiliates from J, ܺ௡௃ ܺ௡⁄ . Equation (16) implies that bilateral FDI 
shares can be used to infer the cluster of parameters including technology transfer costs 
from Japan, technology level in Japan, input costs in host countries, and competition 
from the world. Third, a measure of firms from country J selling to country n is: 
ே೙಻
గ೙಻
ൌ ఑మ
఑భ
௑೙
ఙா೙಻
         (17) 
where ߨ௡௃ ൌ
௑೙಻
௑೙
. 
The number of firms from Japan can be related to FDI share from Japan, host market 
size, and entry costs. Lastly, the average sales of firms from Japan in country n are 
related to the entry costs: 
 ߪܧ௡ ൌ
఑మ
఑భ
തܺ௡௃            (18) 
The expressions above show that some parameters can be inferred from aggregate 
population of Japanese firms/affiliates across markets and their average sales.  
 To specify ߢଵ  and ߢଶ , the distribution ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ is assumed to be joint lognormal. 
This assumption leads to the following: 
ߢଵ ൌ ቂ
ఏ෩
ఏ෩ିଵ
ቃ ݁ݔ݌ ൤
ఙഀାଶఘఙഀఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯ାఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯
మ
ଶ
൨   (19) 
ߢଶ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ൤
൫ఏ෩ఙആ൯
మ
ଶ
൨        (20) 
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Connecting these parameters to the conditions (13) and (14), we obtain: 
Entry Hurdle: ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯=ߢଶ ௡ܰ௃ߟ௡ሺݏሻఏ
෩     (21) 
Latent Sales: ܺ௡௃ሺݏሻ ൌ
఑మ
఑భ
Xഥ௡௃
ఈ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ቀ ௨
ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ቁ
ିଵ
ఏ෩ൗ       (22) 
The modified conditions are linked to data on Japanese multinationals and random 
variables from specified distributions. In the entry hurdle condition, the probability of 
simulated firms entering country n is based on the actual population of Japanese firms 
with foreign affiliates in country n. Conditional upon entry, the latent sales indicates that 
the distribution of sales in country n is scaled by a factor equal to the average sales of 
Japanese affiliates in country n. 
 
4.2 Simulation of Multinational Firms 
 The entry hurdle and latent sales conditions (21) and (22) can be used to simulate 
individual multinational activities. An artificially generated individual producer s is 
characterized by its efficiency draw ݑሺݏሻ, sales shock ߙ௡ሺݏሻ and entry shock ߟ௡ሺݏሻ. The 
only data required for simulation is the population of Japanese firms/affiliates ௡ܰ௃ and 
their aggregate sales X௡௃  in each country n. The four parameters of the distribution 
probabilities of the model are written as Θ ൌ ሺߠ෨, ߪ௔, ߪ௛, ߩሻ: heterogeneity in observed 
sales, variances in sales and entry shocks, and correlation between these shocks. With 
the aggregate data and Θ , we can produce an artificial dataset of heterogeneous 
multinationals on the location and sales of their foreign affiliates. 
The procedure to simulate the total number S of firms proceeds to fix a set of 
parameters of Θ and construct realizations for standardized unit cost uሺݏሻ, and random 
shocks ߙ௡ሺݏሻ and ߟ௡ሺݏሻ for each firm s and country n. These realizations of stochastic 
components of each firm are fixed throughout the estimation.8 From firm- and market-
                                                              
8 We assume that ߙ௡ሺݏሻ and ߟ௡ሺݏሻ have a joint bivariate lognormal distribution: 
൤
lnߙ௡ሺݏሻ
lnߟ௡ሺݏሻ
൨~ N ቈቀ0
0
ቁ , ቆ
σαଶ ρσαση
ρσαση σηଶ
ቇ቉. 
To draw these realizations of random shocks, we use the choleski decomposition factor to construct 
ln  and lna η with:  
൤
lnߙ௡ሺݏሻ
lnߟ௡ሺݏሻ
൨~ ቈቆσαඥ1 െ ρ
ଶ ρσα
0 σ௛
ቇ቉ ൤൬
ܽ௡ሺݏሻ
݄௡ሺݏሻ
൰൨.
 To avoid drawing the firms that end up not selling anywhere, productivity draws are bounded to the 
firms that sell in Japan and at least one foreign market. In doing so, we use the importance sampling 
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specific realizations, we construct the entry hurdle condition (19) for each artificial firm 
across each market. From the entry hurdle matrix for firm and market, we make an 
indicator variable Z of whether each firm establishes an affiliate in each market: 
ܼ௡௞ሺݏሻ ൌ ቄ
 1           if ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡ሺݏሻ
0                    otherwise
     (23) 
When the entry indicator is equal to one, a simulated firm should enter the market and 
generate sales according to the latent sales condition (22). We calculate the volume of 
sales for each affiliate of firm s entering country n. In sum, this procedure allows us to 
simulate the country where each artificial firm s sets up an affiliate and the level of sales 
generated by that affiliate in that country. 
 
4.3 Simulated Method of Moments 
 While the simulation procedure allows us to generate artificial multinational firms 
under a particular set of parameters, we do not have a prior belief about what parameters 
should be chosen for the simulation analysis. In this respect, we adopt the criterion that 
simulated multinationals should have as similar characteristics with real multinationals 
as possible under an optimal set of parameters. These characteristics are defined as 
moments of artificial and actual multinationals. In next section, we determine a 
particular set of characteristics of multinational activities based on actual Japanese 
multinationals.  
 Each of the moments chosen is defined as the share of multinational parent firms 
that fall into a set of mutually exclusive bins. We denote ௞ܰ as the number of actual 
firms achieving an outcome k in the actual data, and ෡ܰ௞  as the number of simulated 
firms achieving the same outcome. For each moment, the number of simulated firms 
falling into each outcome is weighted as follows: 
෡ܰ௞ ൌ
ଵ
S
∑ ݑതሺݏሻܼ௞ሺݏሻSୱୀଵ         (24) 
where ݑതሺݏሻ is the importance weight of each simulated firm. We define the distance 
between actual and artificial moments for outcome k of moments f: 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
from ݑሺݏሻ ൌ ݒሺݏሻݑത௃כሺݏሻ, where random realizations of ݒሺݏሻ are independently drawn from a uniform 
distribution over interval [0,1] and uതJכሺsሻ is the firm-specific hurdle for entering Japanese market and 
at least one foreign market. As this measure serves as a sampling weight, we ensure that all draws 
are to be uሺsሻ ൑ uതJכሺsሻ and over-bias in generating more efficient firms is corrected.
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ݕሺΘሻ ൌ ݉௞௙ െ ෝ݉௞௙ሺΘሻ       (25) 
where ݉௞௙ ൌ ௞ܰ௙  and ෝ݉௞௙ሺΘሻ ൌ N෡௞௙ . ௞ܰ௙  is the share of firms with outcome k in 
moments f relative to the total number of Japanese multinational parents. 
 Equation (25) shows that an optimal set of parameters can be judged from the 
distance between actual and artificial moments, with the smaller distance indicating 
better parameters. To estimate the parameters, we employ simulated method of moments 
as introduced by Pakes and Pollard (1989) and McFadden (1989). This estimation 
method matches moments of the simulated and real data and searches for the set of 
parameters that minimizes the total distance between actual and simulated moments. 
Under the true set of parameter values Θ଴, the following moment condition is assumed 
to hold: 
EሾݕሺΘ଴ሻሿ ൌ 0        (26) 
An objective function can be specified under the following weighted quadratic form: 
Θ෡ ൌ argminΘሼݕሺΘሻ′ W ݕሺΘሻሽ      (27) 
where Θ෡  is an estimated set of parameter values. 
 To search for the parameters that best fit the model, we employ Nelder-Mean 
simplex method (Nelder and Mead, 1965; Lagarias et al. 1998). To further mitigate 
optimization errors, we introduce random variations to the starting values and repeat the 
minimization algorithm for a fixed set of artificial and real moments by 1000 times. 
Finally, we take the optimal parameters that give the minimum distance. 
 The search procedure above should provide us the best fitting parameters, which 
could be subject to sampling errors of real Japanese multinationals and simulation errors 
of artificial multinationals. Bootstrapped standard errors are computed from standard 
deviations between new estimates and the optimal estimates. We resample the real data 
with replacement and generate a new set of ݒ௕, ߙ௕, ߟ௕ . Then, we follow the SMM 
procedure to estimate a new set of parameters  Θ෡௕. Repeating by 25 times, we calculate: 
ܸሺΘሻ ൌ
1
25
෍ሺΘ෡௕ െ Θ෡
כ
ሻሺΘ෡௕ െ Θ෡
כ
ሻ′
ଶହ
ଵ
 
where Θ෡כ is the original best fitting estimate of the parameters. Taking the square root of 
the diagonal elements gives us our standard errors where our calculations account for 
both sampling and simulation error. 
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5 Data Description 
 We employ two sources of firm-level surveys to construct a data set on Japanese 
multinational activity. We first explain each data source and describe how the empirical 
regularities of Japanese manufacturing firms are consistent with our adapted model. 
These illustrations are used to determine the moments for our estimation strategy. 
 
5.1 Data Sources 
 Our data source for domestic firm activity comes from the Kigyou Katsudou Kihon 
Chousa – the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities – by the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The survey covers all 
business firms with 50 employees or more and capital of 30 million yen or more in both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The first survey was conducted in 1991 
and continued annually since 1994. For estimation, this paper primarily exploits the 
survey in 2006.9 The firms in the survey accounted for 5 percent of total firms and 60 
percent of total employees in the Japanese manufacturing sector. 10  In terms of 
employment, the survey is highly representative of manufacturing activity in Japan. 
 Our data source for foreign affiliate sales activity comes from the Kaigai Jigyo 
Katsudo Kihon Chosa – the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities – by METI. A 
survey questionnaire is sent to all the Japanese firms in both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors that are headquartered in Japan with foreign business enterprises; 
more than 10 percent of foreign affiliate’s equity shares must be owned by the Japanese 
parent firm. Because it is not mandatory for firms to respond to the survey, the response 
rate is around 60-70 percent. In 2006, there were 2,165 parent firms that accounted for 
31 percent of total employees in manufacturing firms surveyed in the Kigyou Katsudou 
Kihon Chousa. 
 We use these data sources to link Japanese parent firms with manufacturing foreign 
affiliates. After excluding the affiliates that were out of operation and/or have no sales 
figure, we were able to link 2,032 parent firms with 7,626 foreign affiliates in 70 
markets in total. In this sample, the total sales by foreign affiliates was 99.1 trillion yen. 
                                                              
9 The survey for 1996 is used to construct Table 1 and conduct robustness checks. 
10 The survey results show 12,855 manufacturing firms with 4.9 million employees in 2006. 
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The average Japanese multinationals had 4 foreign affiliates and 5.7 billion foreign sales 
per their affiliate. The maximum number of foreign affiliates per parent firm was 98 and 
the maximum affiliate sales were 425 billion yen.11 However, some parent firms in this 
sample have missing figures of their domestic sales, making it infeasible to calculate a 
measure of their linkage between domestic and foreign sales. While including these 
parent firms in the sample does not alter the magnitude of our estimates, we report the 
estimation results for a sample of 1,656 parent firms excluding firms with missing 
domestic sales in Japan.  
 
5.2  Empirical Patterns of Japanese Multinational Activities 
5.2.1 Market Entry, Pecking Order, and Market Size 
 We use the data to describe empirical regularities of Japanese multinational firms in 
five dimensions. First, Figure 1 shows a relationship between market entry and market 
size. Panel A plots the number of parent firms investing in each market against the 
market size, as measured in real GDP in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars.12 The number of 
firms investing in each market increases with respect to the size of host markets. A 
regression line for the sample used has a slope of 0.76. We also plot the data for year 
1996, which closely matches the linear relationship in 2006 data. 
 Panel B shows the average sales of foreign affiliates in each market against the 
market size. Sales per affiliate increases with respect to the market size, which is 
consistent with the number of investing parent firms. The plots for 1996 data also point 
to a positive relationship. However, a regression line for the 2006 sample has a slope of 
0.44, which is lower than the estimate for entry of firms. It appears that larger markets 
attract more entry of multinational firms, but have a weaker positive impact on average 
affiliate sales. 
 
=== Figure 1 === 
 
 We turn to examine a feature of Japanese multinationals and market entry. As 
                                                              
11 In the following sections, we convert sales in millions of U.S. dollars using the period-average of 
Yen-US dollar exchange rates of 116.3 in 2006. 
12 Data on real GDP come from the World Development Indicator. 
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discussed in Yeaple (2009), firm heterogeneity in productivity predicts a “pecking order” 
in which every firm that invest in certain country should own an affiliate in countries 
that are more attractive than that country. For this examination, the first column of Table 
1 presents the number of Japanese multinational parents that maintain at least one 
foreign affiliate in the top 5 markets: China, the United States, Thailand, Taiwan, and 
Indonesia. There were 1191 multinational parents entering the Chinese market in 2006, 
and 652 in the United States. After excluding duplicate firms among these top markets, 
the total multinational parents amounted to 1972. From the total number, the last 
column reports the fraction of multinationals that own an affiliate in each market. 59 
percent of the Japanese parent firms penetrated the Chinese market whereas 32 percent 
of them entered the U.S. market. 
 We report the number of Japanese firms investing in the strings of top 5 markets 
while ignoring their entry in other markets. In Table 3, the market string shows that 
firms own an affiliate in that market string, but no other among the top 5. The second 
column shows the number of multinationals under such a hierarchy, with 578 
multinationals in total. Among the top 5 markets, 29.3 percent of multinationals 
(578/1972) obey the strict pecking order. To make a benchmark, we compute the 
predicted probability of firms investing in each string when entry in each string is 
independent among the top 5. Under independence, there are 361 multinationals in total; 
for example, 211 multinationals (1972×0.104) would have invested in China. As 18.3 
percent of multinationals follow a pecking order under independence, the data indicate 
the presence of pecking-order forces. 
 
=== Tables 3 and 4 === 
 
5.2.2 Sales Distributions of Japanese Firms 
 As a cross-country pattern is described, we explore the size distribution of Japanese 
firms within individual markets. For the Japanese market, firm size is measured with 
domestic sales that aggregate firms’ sales in Japan and their exports. Then, we 
normalize each firm’s sales relative to the mean of domestic sales and compute a 
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fraction of firms with at least that much sales.13 For other foreign markets, we use total 
sales of foreign affiliates, including their sales to local, home, and third markets. 
 Figure 2 shows a plot of the normalized sales and the fraction of firms for Japan, 
China, the U.S., and Thailand. The shape of sales distributions are similar across 
markets and are closely associated with a Pareto distribution at least in the upper tail. 
This feature provides empirical support for the assumption that efficiency shocks follow 
the Pareto. However, the distribution starts to deviate from the Pareto in the lower tail. 
 
=== Figure 2 === 
 
5.2.3 Market Entry and Sales in Japan 
 We turn to describe a relationship between market entry and sales in Japan. We 
group firms into different sets according to their entry to foreign markets. First, 
Japanese firms are sorted into the set of firms with the minimum number of foreign 
markets they penetrated. Panel A in Figure 3 plots the average sales in Japan for each set 
of firms investing at least k markets or more. Sales in Japan rise monotonically with 
respect to the number of markets in which multinationals own an affiliate. 
 
=== Figure 3 === 
 
 Second, firms are grouped by the number of markets they invested. Panel B 
presents a plot of average sales in Japan against the number of firms investing k markets 
or more, with the marker indicating the number of markets they served. For the set of 
firms investing a single market, there are over 1000 firms with lower average sales in 
Japan. As the number of markets served by them increases, the set of these firms 
becomes smaller and is described by higher levels of sales.  
 Finally, we groups firms into the set of individual markets they invested. Panel C 
plots the average sales in Japan against the number of firms for each economy. The 
relationship is relatively noisy, especially for markets with less than 10 firms. However, 
the relationship becomes generally negative for markets with more than 10 firms. Thus, 
                                                              
13 The fraction is constructed by dividing (rank – 0.5) with the total number of firms/affiliates for 
each observation in a given market, where the rank is one for a firm/affiliate with the largest sales. 
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firms investing in more popular markets tend to have lower sales in Japan and firms 
penetrating less attractive markets are associated with higher levels of domestic sales. 
 In sum, all panels in Figure 3 indicate a significant link between domestic sales and 
market entry. More productive firms, as measured by the size of domestic sales, could 
invest in a larger number of markets and/or less attractive markets. By contrast, less 
productive firms invest in a smaller number of markets and/or more popular markets. 
 
5.2.4 Multinational Production Intensity 
 We turn to describe the relationship between sales in Japan and foreign affiliate 
sales. We compute the normalized sales of foreign affiliates in each market defined by 
ሺX୬ሺjሻ Xഥ୬⁄ ሻ ൫XJሺjሻ XഥJ⁄ ൯ൗ . We divide firm j’s sales by the average sales in that market to 
remove a market effect, which is further divided by the normalized domestic sales to 
remove a firm-size effect. 
 Figure 4 plots the 90th percentile and median normalized sales of foreign affiliates 
against the number of parent firms for each market. The data is noisier for markets with 
less than 10 firms. In contrast, the relationship is generally positive for markets with 
more than 10 firms, implying that normalized affiliate sales increase with respect to the 
popularity of foreign markets. While EKK find small shares for normalized export 
intensity (below 1), we find that foreign sales are much larger relative to domestic sales 
(above 1). 
=== Figure 4 === 
 
5.3 Moments 
The description of Japanese multinational activities yields some empirical 
regularities that should be captured by the simulation of heterogeneous multinationals. 
Based on these empirical patterns, we set the following four moments to be matched 
between artificial and Japanese multinationals.  
First, we choose moments of pecking order string. We compute the share of 
multinationals entering each possible combination of the five most popular countries for 
multinational production. Each string is constructed such that multinationals entering 
the most popular market (China) invest in less popular markets progressively. Then, we 
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make another combination for that string such that multinationals entering the first 
(China) and third (Thailand) invest in less popular markets progressively. By adding up 
all possible combinations, we have 2ହ moments. 
Second, we set moments of distribution of foreign affiliate sales across markets. We 
calculate qth percentiles for multinational sales in each market n, for q =50, 75, 100. For 
each set of firms that enter market n, we use these percentiles to set up sales intervals. 
We then calculate the share of multinationals that fall into each of these bins. The qth 
percentiles are calculated only from the actual data and the simulated firms are set 
according to these bins. (n × 3 moments).  
Third, we employ distribution of multinational parent sales in Japan for moments. 
This moment links the level of sales in Japan to the set of firms that enter market n. We 
calculate qth percentiles (q = 50, 75, 100) over domestic sales in Japan for each set of 
firms that enter market n. These intervals are calculated from the actual data. We then 
assign the firms that fall into these bins and calculate the share of multinationals (n × 3 
moments).  
Finally, multinational production intensity is used for moments. We make two 
intervals for firms whose ratio of sales in market n to sales in Japan is below and above 
50th percentile. Then, we compute the share of simulated firms that sell in each market n 
and fall into either of these percentiles.  
 
6 Estimation Results 
 Simulating 100,000 firms, we first present our best fitting estimated parameters Θ෡  
and discuss the implications of the results. Then, we evaluate model performance 
through internal and external model validation tests.  
 
6.1  Parameter Estimates 
As shown in the descriptive analysis, empirical regularities are relatively noisier for 
markets in which a small number of foreign affiliates have entered.  To mitigate the 
chance of noisier segments of the data adversely influencing our estimates, we exclude 
markets with less than 10 affiliates from our benchmark result. Table 5 presents the 
estimated parameters obtained from the simulation algorithm. Column (1) is our 
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benchmark results. The parameter of size dispersion, ߠ෨ ൌ ߠ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄ , is a key variable 
of interest, for which we obtain an estimate of 1.99 with bootstrapped standard errors of 
0.43. By way of comparison, the estimate is lower than the 2.46 estimate found for 
French exporting firms by EKK. As the smaller value indicates greater dispersion, the 
result implies that Japanese multinationals have a relatively higher level of size 
dispersion in sales than French exporting firms.14 
 The estimated variance of sales shock is 1.64 for Japanese multinationals whereas 
EKK find an estimate of 1.69 for French exporters. These figures are quite similar 
between multinationals and exporters. The estimated variance of the entry shock, 0.39, 
is also larger than the estimate of 0.34 for French exporters. Our larger estimate for the 
variance in sales shock may be explained by the higher level of uncertainty involved for 
the decision to export.  The estimated variance of sales shock is larger than that of the 
entry shock, suggesting that the model is more effective at explaining variations across 
affiliate entry compared to affiliate sales.  
 We proceed to check the robustness of the benchmark estimates. First, we focus on 
host markets with over 10 foreign affiliates in column (1), but a possible concern is that 
the inclusion of small markets could influence the benchmark estimates. To address 
such concerns, we report the estimated parameters for all the markets in column (2). The 
results show that while our estimate for ߠ෨ rises to 2.12, the overall point estimates and 
standard errors are quite similar to the benchmark.  
 Second, we check the sensitivity of the benchmark parameters to a different set of 
moments. Among the moments used, due to differences in vertical and horizontal 
motivations, the pecking order of entry may not fit as well for multinational production 
compared to export entry. To address this concern, we exclude the pecking order 
moments from estimation. Column (3) shows that the estimated parameters and 
bootstrapped standard errors are similar to the benchmark results, suggesting that our 
                                                              
14 For a comparison, Yeaple (2009) provides an estimate of 1.5 for U.S. multinationals if the strict 
pecking order predicted by his model would be observed in the data. Additionally, the level of size 
dispersion is related to heterogeneity in firm efficiency via an elasticity of substitution, which is not 
estimated from the data. To get a rough estimate of efficiency dispersion from our estimated 
parameters, we can use an estimate of ߪ = 2.19 based on Japanese manufacturing data in 1994-2004 
from Kang (2008). This gives us an estimate of ߠ  = 1.99 × (2.191–1) = 2.37 for Japanese 
multinationals in 2006. Using measures of total factor productivity, Wakasugi et al. (2008) find that 
an estimated parameter of productivity dispersion was 1.69 for Japanese manufacturing firms in 
2003. 
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results are robust to the different set of moments used.  
 Finally we estimate the structural parameters with 1996 activity. We find that our 
estimate for ߠ෨ rises to 2.13 but that the difference once again falls within the range of 
the standard errors. Taken together, our robustness checks demonstrate that the 
benchmark estimates of the four parameters are not sensitive to alternative 
specifications of the sample and moments used for estimation. 
 
6.2 Internal Model Validation 
 We use the parameters of column (1) in Table 5 to simulate a new set of 12,855 
artificial firms, which is equal to total manufacturing firms in Japan for 2006. Based on 
our simulations, we can assess how the model replicates the characteristics of Japanese 
multinationals. Specifically, we compare the number of simulated firms and Japanese 
multinational parents along the four different moments as described in section 5. 
 Panel A of Figure 5a shows a scatter plot of simulated and actual firms that belong 
to different strings of the pecking order, with a 45-degrees straight line indicating a 
perfect fit of simulated firms. It is evident that majority of the scatter plots appear near 
the perfect fitting line, suggesting that the model replicates the actual pecking order of 
Japanese multinationals considerably well. However, a deviation appears to be 
relatively larger for the string with few multinational firms. This result is reasonable 
from a quantitative point of view because it is difficult to predict multinational activity 
for markets with limited Japanese foreign affiliate entry. Additionally, Panel B presents 
the similar plots for the moments of foreign affiliate sales. In this figure, we partition 
the firms into three sets of foreign affiliate sales percentile groups in each market, 
counting the number of simulated and actual Japanese firms that fall into each bin. Each 
plot refers to a specific market, so that we label the set of firms that fall below the 50th 
percentile with a country code. The model fit is considerably good for Japanese 
multinationals in terms of the distribution of foreign affiliate sales.  
 Next, Panel C in Figure 5b presents the result of the moments that link sales in 
Japan and their foreign affiliate activities. Sorting multinational parent firms by the 
market they invest, we count the number of parent firms that fall below the 50th, 50-75th, 
and 75-100th percentiles of their sales in Japan. The number of actual firms is plotted for 
each bin against the number of simulated firms, along with a perfect fitting line. We find 
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that the model fit is also good in terms of the moments for sales in Japan. However, the 
difference is larger for the bins with small number of firms. Finally, Panel D shows the 
similar plots for the moments of multinational production intensity. For each market in 
which firms invest, we count the number of simulated and actual firms that fall below 
and above the 50th percentiles of the share of foreign affiliate sales relative to domestic 
sales. The figure suggests that the model captures the real moments of Japanese 
multinationals well. 
 
6.3 External Model Validation 
We have seen that the model is able to replicate the moments of Japanese 
multinational activities, for which underlying parameters are estimated to fit the model 
with data. As in-sample moments are examined for a predictive power of the model, our 
assessment up to this point is regarded as an internal validation of the model. However 
since the assessment is based on moments conditioned in the estimation strategy, alone 
it does not well inform us of the model’s performance out of such contexts.  
Furthermore it is unlikely to give us much confidence in its ability to forecast 
multinational activities in an environment with a significantly different level of FDI 
barriers.  To improve our confidence in the model’s predictive ability, we perform two 
sets of additional validation tests that are based off simulations not conditioned in our 
estimated moment conditions. 
First, we simulate multiple market entries by Japanese multinationals. The model 
predicts that penetration of foreign markets is increasing in firm productivity. Figure 6a 
shows the set of firms according to how many markets they have entered. These set of 
simulations were not conditioned in the model but we see that the simulated firms is 
able to roughly follow the number of actual firms across multiple market entries. 
However, too few firms enter smaller set of countries whereas too many firms enter a 
large set of countries. This suggests that large firms are investing in too many markets 
and small firms in too few. This is likely to be related to the rigid fixed costs imposed in 
the model where multinationals establishing larger affiliates will have higher investment 
startup costs. By contrast, the model assumes that entry fixed costs are not related to the 
size of global operations by multinational parent firm. As result, the model does not 
allow small firms to pay a small fixed cost to establish a foreign affiliate of small size. 
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This assumption may help us to explain why the model slightly misses this set of 
moments. 
Next we proceed to analyze whether the model can explain Japanese multinational 
activities in 1996. Using our estimated structural parameters in 2006, we simulate the 
model with the FDI barriers and market sizes inferred from the 1996 data and assess 
how well the model is able to replicate Japanese multinational activities in 1996. 
Because investment barriers are likely to have dramatically changed for Japanese 
manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2006, this external validation test is in the spirit of 
the “non-random holdout sample”. That is, we assess a model fit by the sample that 
differs significantly from the estimation sample along the dimension that the model is 
meant to predict and falls outside the support of the data (Keane and Wolpin, 2007). If 
our 1996 simulations are found reasonable, we can gain further confidence that the 
model is useful for predicting an impact of changes in FDI barriers on multinational 
activities. 
Figures 6b and 6c replicates the scatter plots of out of sample moments for 1996. To 
be consistent with prior analysis of a model fit, we follow the simulation procedure for 
predicting the moments in 2006. Based on Panels A through D, we find that the model is 
able to replicate the real activity of 1996 Japanese firms reasonably well. The model fit 
is considerably strong along various features of multinational activities. However, we 
also observe that the predictive ability of the model is slightly weaker than what was 
found in the 2006 simulations. We tend to under-simulate sales of foreign affiliates and 
domestic sales in Japan while the model reasonably captures the moments of 
multinational production intensity.  
The observed deviations between the distribution of real and simulated firms 
suggests that Japanese firms in 1996 may contain slight structural deviations from the 
2006 period. Our robustness estimates in table 5, suggests a lower level of dispersion 
(higher ߠ෨) may be found for 1996 sales activity. While the model assumes a fixed 
distributional structure in sales, forces outside the model could have led to slight 
deviations in the actual distribution of sales from the structural parameter estimates15. 
                                                              
15 One factor that could lead to a higher level of dispersion for 2006 firms is increasing levels of 
exporting activity. Since we estimate our distribution parameter based strictly off of conditional sales 
on firm/multinational entry and do not account for export activity, our estimates of ߠ෨ may be biased 
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Nevertheless, we find that a replication of Japanese multinationals in 1996 is reasonable 
and offers further credibility in the model being able to simulate individual 
multinational activities given changes in the economic environment. 
 
6.4 Where Does the Model Fail? 
We have shown that our framework can reasonably simulate Japanese multinational 
activities which are based on entry and sales conditions dictated by the model. Because 
the model is constructed to capture only key elements of multinational behaviors in a 
simple way, our model does not take into account other potentially important 
motivations for FDI. In particular, a critical feature of multinationals that is missing in 
our model is firm exporting activity. To assess how this simplification of the model 
affects its ability to replicate Japanese multinational behavior, we focus exclusively on 
vertical oriented firms for which more than 50% of sales by their foreign affiliates are 
yielded from exports to Japan. 
We compare vertical FDI firms in the data with firms that are simulated as 
prescribed by the model. Figure 7 shows that real vertical activity is systematically 
different from the simulations of the model. Real Japanese vertical firms activity is 
much smaller than what is found by our simulated firms for affiliate production in the 
United States, Europe, and other markets more generally classified as market-seeking 
destinations rather than factor-seeking. By contrast, we find that real Japanese vertical 
firm activity is much larger than our simulated firm activity for China and Vietnam, 
countries that are more likely to be driven by factor cost differentials.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This research introduces a new micro-simulation framework for examining 
multinational activity across home and host countries. Based on the structural approach 
of Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010), the model is designed to simulate entry and 
sales activity of heterogeneous firms across asymmetric countries in the presence of 
fixed entry costs and costly technology/management transfer. The model yields 
empirical implications consistent with Japanese multinational activities in 2006. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
upward (Levchenko and Giovanni, 2010). While our model ignores exporting activity, increasing 
levels of trade during the past decade could increase this bias. 
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Matching the model with data on Japanese multinationals, we estimated the structural 
parameters with simulated method of moments and found the parameter estimates to be 
in line with previous studies and robust to different estimation designs. The fully 
quantified model allows us to simulate entry and sales of foreign affiliates of Japanese 
firms. 
Through internal and external validation exercises, we rigorously tested how well 
the model performed in replicating real multinational activity. Our results demonstrated 
that the model could strongly replicate in-sample moments. Multinational activity not 
conditioned in the estimation strategy also performed considerably well. While our 1996 
out-of-sample predictions contained slight deviations from the data, the overall 
simulations suggest that the model is externally consistent with the Japanese 
multinational activity from a decade prior. We also found several shortcomings of the 
model.  First, large firms invest in too many countries, and small firms invest in too few. 
Second, we tend to under-simulate the level of sales of Japanese multinationals in both 
home and foreign markets. Lastly, the model poorly explains vertically motivated 
multinationals. Nonetheless, the predictive power of the model was found robust to the 
estimation strategy, and yields considerable support for its ability to replicate Japanese 
multinational activities. 
Our research highlights the richness of our simulation framework for understanding 
multinational activity. It represents the first step towards developing a framework that 
can simulate individual multinational activity. There are two potential extensions of this 
work. First, we can embed the model into a complete general equilibrium to calibrate 
the rest of Japan’s macro-economy in a global setting. This allows us to conduct 
counterfactual analysis of the impacts from changes in FDI policies at the individual 
firm level. The resulting framework will be capable of not only quantifying the 
economic gains from FDI, but in assessing the distributive impacts of economic 
integration and its more complex restructuring effects on firms. This future 
computational model will generate a useful quantitative tool for evaluating policy 
designs related to FDI. Second, we can incorporate an interaction between trade and 
FDI in firm-level decisions, which will lead to complex integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms servicing foreign markets. Future research is to combine firm 
exporting and FDI activity in an integrated micro-simulation framework. 
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Table 1. Firm Entry and Exit by Initial Size in 1996 and 2006 
  # All Firms # Multinationals 
Initial Size Interval 
(percentile) 
Year Change 
from 1996 
Year Change 
from 19961996 2006 1996 2006 
0 to 10 1,411 1,376 -35 0 3 3 
10 to 20 1,410 1,276 -134 5 13 8 
20 to 30 1,411 1,178 -233 3 20 17 
30 to 40 1,412 1,229 -183 11 40 29 
40 to 50 1,412 1,202 -210 16 36 20 
50 to 60 1,414 1,191 -223 27 73 46 
60 to 70 1,411 1,299 -112 51 113 62 
70 to 80 1,413 1,229 -184 75 185 110 
80 to 90 1,412 1,409 -3 184 359 175 
90 to 99 1,270 1,309 39 464 677 213 
99 to 100 141 157 16 124 137 13 
Total 14,117 12,855 -1,262 960 1,656 696 
Notes: Percentile bins are determined by parent firms' global sales in 1996; all firms include 
domestic and multinational firms in manufacturing; we drop firms with missing domestic sales. 
Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, and Basic Survey of 
Overseas Business Activities from METI. 
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Table 2. Firm Growth by Initial Size in 1996 and 2006 
Domestic Sales Multinational Sales Global Sales 
Initial Size 
Interval Year Change from 
1996 
Year Change from 
1996 
Year Change from 
1996 
(percentile) 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 
0 to 10 1.21 1.17 -0.04 0.0 0.0003 0.0003 1.21 1.17 -0.04 
10 to 20 2.07 1.87 -0.20 0.001 0.003 0.002 2.07 1.87 -0.20 
20 to 30 2.84 2.36 -0.48 0.001 0.01 0.005 2.84 2.37 -0.47 
30 to 40 3.73 3.23 -0.50 0.003 0.02 0.02 3.73 3.25 -0.48 
40 to 50 4.93 4.15 -0.78 0.01 0.03 0.02 4.94 4.18 -0.76 
50 to 60 6.61 5.48 -1.13 0.02 0.07 0.05 6.62 5.55 -1.07 
60 to 70 9.23 8.45 -0.78 0.06 0.15 0.09 9.29 8.60 -0.69 
70 to 80 14.2 12.2 -2.06 0.11 0.32 0.21 14.4 12.5 -1.85 
80 to 90 26.9 26.0 -0.90 0.54 1.31 0.77 27.5 27.3 -0.13 
90 to 99 110.4 110.1 -0.30 8.89 16.5 7.66 119.3 126.6 7.30 
99 to 100 234.6 212.1 -22.5 38.0 76.5 38.4 272.7 288.6 15.9 
Total 416.8 387.1 -29.7 47.7 94.9 47.2 464.5 482.0 17.5 
Notes: Percentile bins are determined by parent firms' global sales in 1996; sales are in trillions of 2006 Japanese Yen; domestic sales include purely 
domestic sales of all firms; multinational sales include only sales of foreign affiliates by multinational firms. 
Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, and Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities from METI. 
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Table 3: Japanese Firms Investing in the Top 5 Countries 
Market Number of Multinationals Fraction of Multinationals
China 1191 0.59 
United States 652 0.32 
Thailand 525 0.26 
Taiwan 318 0.16 
Indonesia 311 0.15 
Total 1972 
Note: Total indicates the total number of multinational parent firms that invest in these 
top 5 markets. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Japanese Firms Investing in the Strings of Top 5 Countries 
  
If FDI in each string is 
independent in the top 5 
Market String* 
Number of 
Multinationals 
Predicted 
Probability 
Number of 
Multinationals 
CHN 479 10.4% 211 
CHN-USA 60 5.1% 104 
CHN-USA-THA 29 1.9% 38 
CHN-USA-THA-TWN 6 0.4% 7 
CHN-USA-THA-TWN-IND 4 0.1% 1 
Total 578 361 
Multinationals in Pecking Order 29.3% 18.3% 
* The market string shows that firms invest in that market(s), but no other among the top 5.  
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Table 5. Estimation Results of Parameters     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Markets Markets with over 10 affiliates All Markets 
Markets with over 10 
affiliates 
Markets with over 10 
affiliates 
Year 2006 2006 2006 1996 
Moments All All No Pecking Order String All 
Variable 
ߠ෨ 1.99 2.12 1.95 2.13 
(size dispersion) (0.43) (0.95) (0.64) (0.53) 
ߪ௔ 1.64 1.64 1.66 1.36 
(variance of sales shock) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
ߪ௛ 0.39 0.52 0.34 0.45 
(variance of entry shock) (0.31) (0.16) (0.42) (0.43) 
ߩ -0.62 -0.55 -0.64 -0.99 
(correlation of sales and entry shocks) (0.34) (0.25) (0.51) (0.56) 
Notes: figures indicate parameter estimates of each variable for a minimum value of the objective function; parentheses are bootstrapped standard 
errors from initial fixed parameter estimates with 1000 repetitions; each bootstrapping simulates 100,000 firms and uses randomly sampled Japanese 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
References 
 
Aw, B. Y., and Lee, Y. 2008, “Firm Heterogeneity and Location Choice of Taiwanese 
 Multinationals”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 167-179. 
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B., and Kortum, S. 2003, “Plants and Productivity in 
 International Trade”, American Economic Review, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 1268-1290. 
Brainard, S. L. 1997, “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-off 
 between Multinational Sales and Trade”, American Economic Review, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 
 520-544. 
Chaney, T. 2008, “Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International 
 Trade”, American Economic Review, vol. 98, no. 4, pp. 1707-1721. 
Chen, M. X., and Moore, M. O. 2010, “Location Decision of Heterogeneous Multinational  
Firms”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 188-199. 
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., and Kramarz, F. 2010, “An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence 
 from French Firms”, Forthcoming in Econometrica. 
Eaton, J., and Kortum, S. 2002, “Technology, Geography, and Trade”, Econometrica, vol. 70, 
 no. 5, pp. 1741-1779. 
Feinberg, S. E., and Keane, M. P. 2006, “Accounting for the Growth of MNC-Based Trade  
 Using a Structural Model of U.S. MNCs”, American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5, pp. 
 1515-1558. 
Garetto, S., 2009, “Input Sourcing and Multinational Production”, Mimeo. 
Girma, S., Kneller, R., and Pisu, M. 2005, “Exports versus FDI: An Empirical Test”,  Review of 
 World Economics/Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 141, no. 2, pp. 193-218. 
Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., and Szeidl, A. 2006, “Optimal Integration Strategies for the 
 Multinational Firm”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 216-238. 
Head, K., and Ries, J. 2003, “Heterogeneity and the FDI versus Export Decision of Japanese 
 Manufacturers”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 
 448-467. 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J., and Yeaple, S. R. 2004, “Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous 
 Firms”, American Economic Review, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 300-316. 
Kang, K., 2008, “How much have been the export products changed from homogeneous to 
 differentiated? Evidence from China, Japan, and Korea”, China Economic Review 19, 128-
 137. 
Keane, M. P. 2010, “Structural vs. Atheoretic Approaches to Econometrics”, Journal of 
 Econometrics, vol. 156, no. 1, pp. 3-20. 
Keane, M. P., and Wolpin, K. I., 2007, “Exploring the Usefulness of a Nonrandom Holdout  
Sample for Model Validation: Welfare Effects on Female Behavior”, International 
Economic Review, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 1351-1378. 
Keller, W., and Yeaple, S. R. 2009, “Global Production and Trade in the Knowledge Economy”, 
 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. 
Lagarias, J. C., Reeds, J. A., Wright, M. H., and Wright, P. E. 1998, “Convergence Properties of  
the Nelder-Mead Simplex Method in Low Dimensions”, SIAM Journal on Optimization. 
vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 112-147. 
Levchenko, A. A., J. Di Giovanni, and R. Ranciere, 2010, “Power Laws in Firm Size and 
 Openness to Trade: Measurement and Implications”, IMF Working Papers 109, 1-31. 
Markusen, J. R. 2002, “Multinational firms and the theory of international trade”, MIT Press, 
 Cambridge and London. 
McFadden, D. 1989, “A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response 
 Models Without Numerical Integration”, Econometrica, vol. 57, No. 5, pp. 995-1026. 
Melitz, M.J. 2003, “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
 Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, vol. 71, no. 6, pp. 1695-1725.  
44 
 
Nelder, J. A., and Mead, R. 1965, “A Simplex Method for Function Minimization”, Computer  
Journal, vol. 7, pp. 308-313. 
Pakes, A., and Pollard, D. 1989, “Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization 
 Estimators”, Econometrica, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 1027-1057. 
Ramondo, N., 2010, A Quantitative Approach to Multinational Production, Mimeo. 
Ramondo, N., and Rodriguez-Clare, A. 2009, “Trade, Multinational Production, and the Gains 
 from Openness”, NBER Working Papers No. 15604. 
Todo, Y. 2009, “Quantitative Evaluation of Determinants of Export and FDI: Firm-Level 
 Evidence from Japan”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-E-019. 
Tomiura, E. 2007, “Foreign Outsourcing, Exporting, and FDI: A Productivity Comparison at the 
 Firm Level”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 113-127. 
UNCTAD, 2010, “World Investment Report 2010”. United Nations, New York. 
Yeaple, S.R. 2009, “Firm Heterogeneity and the Structure of U.S. Multinational Activity”, 
 Journal of International Economics, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 206-215. 
Wakasugi, R., Todo, Y., Sato, H., Nishioka, S., Matsuura, T., Ito, B., and Tanaka, A., “The 
 Internationalization of Japanese Firms: New Findings Based on Firm-Level Data”, RIETI 
 Discussion Paper Series 08-E-036. 
Investment Climate Advisory Services. 2010, “Investing Across Borders”, World Bank Group,  
Washington D.C.  
 
 
 
